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I. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
The separation of powers, according to the classical theories of
John Locke, Charles Secondat Baron de Montesquieu, and the
"checks and balances" of the American Constitution and practice,
is a very recent reality in Mexico. Although the principle has al-
ways been formally recognized, the country achieved its two long
periods of stability under autocratic and oligarchic regimes.'
Mexico lacks a democratic tradition. There are not recurrent
episodes of free elections and participative regimes with alternat-
ing political parties, which, although frustrated by military coups,
abound in the rest of the Ibero-American countries.
During the twentieth century, Mexican society evolved in a dy-
namic process. It increased in number and in ethnic mix and
transformed from rural to urban. Additionally, life expectancy,
health conditions, and educational levels registered spectacular
increases, and an enhanced middle class developed. The popula-
tion also evolved from a passive spectator, a resigned and expec-
tant mass, to a heterogeneous and active conglomerate, even
though, if compared with industrialized democracies, it is still in
1. These long periods of stability occurred between 1876 and 1910, as well as between
1929 and 2000.
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an initial state of civil conscience and organization process of in-
dependent groups.
Mexico is ruled today under a Constitution that has been in
force since 1917.2 It is through a series of reforms to the original
normativity that Mexico has been achieving a transition toward
democracy.
For many years, the 1917 Constitution was catalogued as
"nominal" in the sense that Karl Loewenstein gave to this term: it
was formally observed, even though power was concentrated in a
political oligarchy. 3 As Loewenstein rightfully pointed out, socio-
economic conditions impeded its total fulfillment, but in the last
instance, this could possibly be discerned with time.
4
Today, the Constitution can be conceptualized as "normative" by
Loewenstein, as actions correspond to the established rule and
power has been spread among several institutions and social enti-
ties. 5
According to the Mexican Constitution, a separation exists be-
tween the legislative and the executive branches. 6 The executive
branch is wholly vested in the President, who is elected by direct
popular vote. The legislative is vested in a collective body, the
Congress of the Union, which is divided into two chambers: one of
deputies (representatives) and one of senators.
7
The Chamber of Deputies is composed of 300 members elected
by relative majority in an identical number of single-member con-
stituencies and 200 by the principle of proportional representa-
2. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas provided the following objective sources for a reader
seeking to expand his or her base knowledge of the history of the 1917 Constitution: DIARIO
DE DEBATES DEL CONGRESO CONSTITUYENTE 1916-1917 [NEWSPAPER OF DEBATES OF THE
CONSTITUENT CONGRESS 1916-191 7]; PASTOR ROUAIX, GkNESIS DE LOS ARTfCULOS 27 Y 123
[GENESIS OF ARTICLES 27 AND 123] (Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Institutional
Revolutionary Party] ed., 1984); JOSk GAMAS TORRUCO, LA VIGENCIA DE LA CONSTITUCi6N
DE 1857 (LAS REFORMAS) [THE FORCE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1857 (THE REFORMS)], IN EL
PROCESO CONSTITUYENTE MEXICANO (A 150 AROS DE LA CONSTITUCI6N DE 1857 Y 90 DE LA
CONSTITUCION DE 1917) [THE MEXICAN CONSTITUENT PROCESS (TO 150 YEARS OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1857 AND 90 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1917)] (2007).]
3. See KARL LOEWENSTEIN, TEORtA DE LA CONSTITUCI6N [THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION] 216-25 (Alfredo Gallego Anabitarte, trans., 1964).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. (Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas provided the following objective source for a reader seek-
ing to expand his or her base knowledge of the political institutions in Mexico: JOSt
MIRANDA, LAS IDEAS Y LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS MEXICANAS [THE IDEAS AND THE
MEXICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS] (Instituto de Derecho Comparado [Inst. of Comp. Rts.],
1952).]
7. CONSTITUCI6N POLfTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF MEXICO] (hereinafter MEX. CONST.) art. 50.
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tion, through regional lists in five multi-member constituencies
into which the national territory is divided. No party can have
more than 300 representatives through both principles.
8
The Chamber of Senators is composed of 128 members. Within
each of the 31 states and the Federal District, two are elected by
relative majority voting (64), one is assigned to the first minority
(32), and the remainder (32) are elected through the principle of
proportional representation through the system of lists in a single
national multi-member constituency.
9
Each branch has its own powers, which it exercises independ-
ently, even though the participation of both is required for some.
They are clearly and expressly established: Congress makes the
law, and the President enforces it.10 Their functions are clearly
separated.
Incompatibility exists between the legislative and administra-
tive offices.1'
Both branches issue from the popular vote, which elects them
separately and so bestows each branch with its own legitimacy.
Second, the President freely appoints and dismisses his imme-
diate subordinates, who are the secretaries of state in charge of
the different departments and occupy the highest hierarchy in the
administration. 12 The President, however, possesses the constitu-
tional powers, not the secretaries.
13
Third, the Executive and its secretaries are not responsible to
Congress as in a parliamentary system, in the sense that having
lost the support of the majority they should necessarily resign.
The characteristic mechanisms of the parliamentary regime are
absent. The election and integration of each organ of power are
8. MEX. CONST. art. 51, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [Official [Gazette
or Journal or Diary] of the Federation] (hereinafter D.O.) (Dec. 6, 1977); MEX. CONST. arts.
52-53, as amended, D.O. (Dec. 15, 1986); MEX. CONST. art. 54, as amended, D.O. (Aug. 22,
1996). [Editor's Note: The D.O. is a daily governmental publication like the United States'
Federal Register. For more information or to retrieve laws from the D.O., visit
http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/EN/PtMain.php?pagina=dof. Note that dates within the
D.O. often are expressed day-month-year as opposed to month/day/year. At the author's
request, the use of as amended within the footnotes reflects a literal change to the text of the
Mexican Constitution upon which the author relies. D. 0. laws, etc., that amend a portion of
the Mexican Constitutional Article upon which the author is not directly relying are omitted
because more than 500 Mexican Constitutional Amendments exist.]
9. MEX. CONST. art. 56, as amended, D.O. (Aug. 22, 1996).
10. MEX. CONST. arts. 73, 80, & 89.
11. MEX. CONST. art. 62.
12. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § II, as amended, D.O. (Dec. 31, 1994).
13. The President has the powers because they are so enumerated in the Mexican Con-
stitution, but no specific powers are vested in the secretaries. It is the U.S. American sys-
tem that we took as a model.
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simultaneous but separated. As a result, the executive does not
"emerge" from the majority of the legislative. There exists no
"cabinet" with collective responsibility before the legislative as-
sembly. Additionally, there do not exist "motions of censure" emit-
ted by the legislative nor denied "votes of confidence" previously
demanded by the Executive that would force the resignation of the
President and his secretaries in cases of disagreement, if an im-
portant initiative is blocked or an action is severely criticized.
The President does not have any constitutional power to dis-
solve Congress and hold new elections outside the terms that are
constitutionally set forth. Therefore, elections do not exist outside
of the constitutionally mandated time periods.
14
However, it is understood that in the presidential system, as
well as in the parliamentary system, ample cooperation between
both organs of power is required for their proper functioning as
well as for the country's governance.
II. HISTORY
The presidential institution in Mexico was established in the
first Constitution in 1824, once the country achieved independence
from Spain and after an autocratic attempt to establish a monar-
chy succeeded for a brief period. 15
At this time, there were only three written constitutional mod-
els in existence: the French Declaration of Human Rights of 1789
and the revolutionary constitution of 1791; the United States Con-
stitution of 1787; and the episodic Cadix (or Cadiz) Constitution of
1812. The 1824 Constitution adopted the form of government pre-
14. These constitutionally mandated time periods are as follows: six years for the
President, three years for the deputies, and six years for the senators. MEX. CONST. art. 80,
as amended, D.O. (Jan. 29, 1928); MEX. CONST. arts. 51 & 56, as amended, D.O. (Apr. 29,
1933).
15. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas provided the following objective sources for a reader
seeking to expand his or her base knowledge of the events leading to Mexico's emergence from
Spanish colonial rule: J.M. OTS CAPDEQUI, EL ESTADO ESPAIgOL EN LAS INDIAS [THE
SPANISH STATE IN THE INDIES] (1941); 4 RUBIO MA99 JOSk IGNACIO, EL VIRREINATO [THE
VICEROYALTY] (Instituto de Investigaciones Histdricas [Inst. of Historic Investigations] &
Fondo de Cultura Econdmica [Fund of Economic Culture], eds., 1983); SILVIO ZAVALA, EL
MUNDO AMERICANO EN LA EPOCA COLONIAL [THE AMERICAN WORLD IN THE COLONIAL
EPOCH] (1967); TIMOTHY E. ANNA, LA CAIDA DEL GOBIERNO ESPAINOL EN LA CIUDAD DE
MtXICO [THE FALL OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT IN MEXICO CITY] (Spanish ed. 1981);
ROMEO FLORES CABALLERO, LA CONTRARREVOLUCI6N EN LAINDEPENDENCIA [THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE INDEPENDENCE] (1973); GUADALUPE NAVA OTEO, CABILDOS DE
LA NUEVA ESPANA EN 1808 [CITY HALLS OF THE NEW SPAIN IN 1808] (1973); Luis VILLORO,
EL PROCESO IDEOL6GICO DE LA REVOLUCI6N DE INDEPENDENCIA [THE IDEOLOGICAL
PROCESS OF THE REVOLUTION OF INDEPENDENCE] (1977).]
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sent in the United States: republican, democratic, federal, presi-
dential, and bicameral.
If in the scope of Federalism, the Constitution of 1824 clearly
favored the provinces, at that moment, very strong and independ-
ent, upgrading them to states. 16 The state legislatures were given
power to appoint the senators and to elect the President, the Vice
President, and the justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the
power to rule the electoral system for the federal and local elec-
tions. Concerning federal powers, the Congress was privileged
over the Executive, concentrating on almost all the important de-
cisions. The suspicion for a new autocratic attempt was present.
However, the most serious limitation to the Executive was the
Vice-Presidential system, which was vested in the individual who
received the second-most votes in the respective election. There-
fore, the Vice Presidency was in the hands of the main rival to the
President. Additionally, it gave the Vice President the chairman-
ship of the Council of Government (group of Representatives and
Senators acting during the recesses of the Congress), which as-
sured him a permanent presence in active politics.
There existed two major trends from the outset of the Republic.
The first one sought the organization of the Republic through the
federal system, the separation of powers, the recognition of human
rights, and the extension of political participation. The other
trend present was engaged in the preservation of the real powers
dominant during the colonial times, the criollo'7 oligarchy, the
Catholic Church, and the Army. The political arena was a con-
fused society, as it was alien to the controversies set forth, ethni-
cally and socioeconomically stratified, poor and illiterate in the
great majority, and with the heavy burden of three centuries of
authoritarian colonial regime and the spiritual domination by the
intolerant dogmatism of the Catholic Church. The middle class
was very small. The number of political actors was limited and
their political positions inflexible.
The republican democratic institutions lasted only until the sec-
ond presidential election. The losing candidate alleged fraud, in-
16. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas provided the following objective sources for a reader
seeking to expand his or her base knowledge of Mexican federalism and the first Mexican
Federal Republic: NETTIE LEE BENSON, LA DIPUTACI6N PROVINCIAL Y EL FEDERALISMO
MEXICANO [THE PROVINCIAL DELEGATION AND MEXICAN FEDERALISM] (1955); MICHAEL P.
COSTELOE, LA PRIMERA REPOBLICA FEDERAL DE MExico [THE FIRST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
MEXICO] (Spanish ed. 1975).]
17. The descendants of pure Spanish blood born in Mexico and inheritors of their par-
ents' fortunes, but deprived from political participation.
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cited a popular revolt in the capital city, and gained recognition.
He was deposed later by a military coup led by the Vice President.
Henceforth, the people were constantly manipulated to revolt.
The number of rifles, not of votes, won elections and was the only
judge of the performance of each government. The permanent
conflict between liberals and conservatives, labeled in terms of
their respective institutional designs as "federalists" or "central-
ists," was intermittently and temporarily resolved in favor of one
or the other, always by the force of arms.
From 1833 to 1857, the triumph was conservative, except for a
brief liberal interregnum in 1847, which resulted in the constitu-
tions of 1836 and 1843.
The Constitutional Laws of 1836 established a normative mo-
rass with respect to the integration of the public powers. These
laws aimed to maintain the control of the criollo oligarchy and
establish equilibrium between all the real powers in order to avoid
conflicts derived from internal divisions. To vote and to be a can-
didate for any office, a minimum income and level of culture was
required. Only the Chamber of Deputies was elected in this man-
ner. Insofar as the President was concerned, the rules revealed a
profound suspicion with respect to the granting of powers. The
election of the President was carried out by both chambers, the
High Court of Justice, and the department committees. The bal-
ance of power favored the Congress.
This time, the real problem was the creation of the Supreme
Conservative Power, a "super branch" that was set to make sure
that the actions of those who integrated the three traditional ones
conformed to the supreme law.18 This attempt to achieve an un-
bounded political control destabilized the entire system.
The "Organic Basis" of 1843 created a constitutional structure
around the Executive. The strengthening of the presidential insti-
tution can be explained by the dominance of national politics at
that time by Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna. The text was tailored
to satisfy his autocratic ambitions.
The Reform Act of 1847 resulted from a liberal triumph in the
midst of military defeat in the war against the United States and
reestablished the Constitution of 1824 with indispensable
18. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas provided the following objective source for a reader seek-
ing to expand his or her base knowledge of Mexican conservatism: 2 ALFONSO NORIEGA, EL
PENSAMIENTO CONSERVADOR Y EL CONSERVADURISMO MEXICANO [CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT
AND MEXICAN CONSERVATISM] (1972).]
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changes. 19 These changes included the abolishment of the Vice
Presidency and establishment of a constitutional defense as judi-
cial control via the amparo and through reciprocal political control
of laws from the Federal Congress and the state legislatures. The
elected President could hold office for the constitutional term.
When the war with the United States concluded, Santa Anna
returned in 1852 and established a dictatorial regime.
The Constitution of 1857 was the outcome of a revolution
against Santa Anna's dictatorship. 20 Its enforcement was inter-
rupted by a three-year war waged by the Catholic Church and the
conservatives against the secular State that the new Constitu-
tional regulation had established. The liberal armed triumph was
immediately altered by the French invasion and the establishment
of the empire of Maximilian of Habsburg, who was chosen as the
Emperor of Mexico in a compromise between the defeated conser-
vatives and French Emperor Napoleon 111.21
The Constitution of 1857 was not fully in force until 1867.22 A
remarkable political class took over and started to carry on a lib-
eral economy, political freedom, and democratic practice. The
Constitution reveals the full agreement between the then-
members of the Constitutional Convention to avoid the autocratic
government. It tied the legitimacy of Congress and that of the
President to popular election with universal suffrage. The Legis-
lative was strengthened, nearly placing the Executive in subordi-
nation. The Congress was composed by a single chamber with
19. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas provided the following objective source for a reader seek-
ing to expand his or her base knowledge of Mexican liberalism: 3 JESOS REYES HER6LES,
EL LIBERALISMO MEXICANO [MEXICAN LIBERALISM] (195 7).]
20. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas provided the following objective source for a reader seek-
ing to expand his or her base knowledge of the events leading to the Constitution of 1857:
ZARco, HisTORIA DEL CONGRESO EXTRAORDINARIO CONSTITUYENTE 1856-1857 [HISTORY OF
THE EXTRAORDINARY CONSTITUENT CONGRESS 1856-1857] (The Sch. of Mex. reprint 1956).]
21. The French invasion favored by Mexican conservatives was the result of a very
erratic political calculation: the intention was to take advantage of the Mexican internal
instability and create a European monarchy in the American continent to balance the
power of the "two republics" that will result from the American Civil War. Napoleon III bet
on the South victory. The experiment had a fatal outcome. The French faced an unex-
pected Mexican resistance (the first "guerrilla war" in history) and the final victory of the
Union. Facing the Prussian menace, the French retreated. Maximilian of Habsburg, Em-
peror of Mexico, was judged and executed by the Mexican government of Benito Judrez,
who successfully led the resistance. This conflict is a very important chapter in the history
of our continent.
22. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas provided the following objective source for a reader seek-
ing to expand his or her base knowledge of the Constitution of 1857: IMER B. FLORES, LA
CONSTITUCi6N DE 1857 Y SUS REFORMAS A 150 ANOS DE SU PROMULGACI6N [THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1857 AND ITS REFORMS TO 150 YEARS OF ITS PROMULGATION] (2007).]
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powers of a legislative and financial nature and to approve actions
by the Executive in considerable number and importance. Two
periods of ordinary sessions were established, the first of which
could be protracted. During the recess, a Council of Government
was created, made of one representative for each state or territory.
The application of such provisions kept the Congress permanently
in session.
Additionally, the President was deprived of the veto, limiting
him to simple observations of the bills.
President Judrez clearly manifested his opposition to such sub-
ordination, which made carrying out government tasks considera-
bly difficult. In the face of constant uprisings by the popular re-
gional caudillos, warlords who had been elevated and strength-
ened as a result of the past two military conflicts, it was necessary
to govern the states under the regime of "suspension of bill of
rights," established in the Constitution, and according to its rules
and limitations for almost 10 years after the restoration of the Re-
public.
The reforms of 1874, promulgated by President Lerdo de Tejada,
introduced a bicameral legislature and restored the presidential
veto.
The unrest of the states was permanent. Five years later, in
1879, a revolt initiated at Tuxtepec by the popular general Porfirio
Diaz, hero of the War of French Intervention, succeeded and in-
stalled a regime that lasted 30 years.
Diaz formally respected the Constitution of 1857, but exercised
autocratic power. His regime achieved peace, political stability,
and unprecedented growth of the overall economy. He disre-
garded the unequal distribution of wealth, the social immobility,
the abuses of landowners, the desperate situation of peasants in
the haciendas, and the demands of urban workers. As a result,
the system was closed in benefit of a new formed aristocracy, with
the exclusion of some provincial bourgeoisie and a new generation
of young middle-class professionals.
The necessary conclusion of all the preceding is that the strong
presidency in Mexico was never due to a constitutional recogni-
tion. It appeared, until the last decades of the nineteenth century,
as a "meta-constitutional phenomenon" as a result of a turbulent
and disorderly political life. No constitution, except that of 1843,
granted excessive powers to the President. Moreover, all of them
tried to measure the allocation of powers to the Executive to avoid
the recurrent tendency of an autocratic government.
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It was not the absence of an adequate normative scheme that
produced instability. Rather, this was caused by the political,
economic, and social circumstances of Independent Mexico, where
the authoritarian colonial heritage, the defense of the traditional
interests and privileges, the incipient development of the middle
classes, and the extreme economic, ethnic, and social inequalities
made impossible the establishment of the constitutional state and
institutions.
III. PRESIDENT-PARTY SYSTEM
The term presidentialism has been fashioned to refer to the
enormous power that the President accumulated in Mexico begin-
ning in 1929, when the National Revolutionary Party was
founded, until 2000, when its inheritor, the Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party (PRI), lost the federal election. 23
The system was defined in the treaties of political science with a
variety of labels: semi-democracy, soft dictature, mild authori-
tarianism. We prefer the neutral qualification of President-Party,
which fits better describing the reality of the separation of powers.
The Constitution of 1917 was the result of the Revolution that
occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, there
were two consecutive armed conflicts: the political one initiated
by Francisco Madero in 1910, and the major political and social
revolt led by Venustiano Carranza in 1913.
The first revolutionary movement overthrew the dictatorship of
Porfirio Diaz and achieved the election of a democratic govern-
ment. But President Madero, with excessive democratic zeal, did
not create a strong government, compromised with the economic
and political forces of the vanquished regime, neglected the social
changes sought after by the revolutionaries and provoked many of
them to withdraw their support. Finally, he was deposed after
almost a year by a military coup.
The second movement was an uprising against the new dicta-
torship. This revolt gathered an important segment of the bour-
23. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas was kind enough to provide us with many sources, in-
cluding the general primers listed in note *, supra. In our correspondence, Dr. Gamas noted,
however, that certain propositions could not, should not, and would not be attributable to
another document. I have captured a portion of his insightful analysis of this issue for the
reader as follows: 'This contention and subsequent lines are my own explanation. I want
them preserved as such because it reveals my own appreciation of 70 years of PRI rule. I
tried to be as objective as possible. There are few texts on some of these matters; all of them
are contaminated by political positions.']
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geoisie, organized peasant groups and active members of the grow-
ing middle class.
The outcome was the call of a constitutional convention, whose
members rejected the concentration of power, either in the execu-
tive or in the legislative, while trying to reinforce the former,
which had a diminished role in prior constitutions. For this rea-
son, the characteristic balances of the presidential system and the
principle of no reelection for the President of the Republic were
established. The Constitution completed the traditional bill of
rights with agrarian and labor reforms and the national property
of natural resources. It also contained hard provisions against the
Catholic Church for its support of the counter-revolutionary
movements.
The aftermath of the revolution was not very promising in
reaching the purposes constitutionally stated.
The first elected president, Venustiano Carranza, was assassi-
nated, and the power held by a group of caudillos that emerged
from the petty bourgeoisie of the northern state of Sonora was led
by Alvaro Obreg6n and Plutarco Elias Calles, who were succes-
sively elected presidents. The political control of the provinces
was mostly in the hands of the revolutionary chiefs, and the peace
was precarious. Notwithstanding such events, the presidential
authority was affirmed, and the basis for the modernization of the
country was set up: the central bank was founded, and with it,
the basis for a financial system, so far inexistent; irrigation pro-
grams started, lands for commercial agricultural and agrarian
reform was carried slowly and at a prudent pace; roads were built
and education and health programs became successfully in force;
the international conflicts, issued from the destruction of foreign
property during the past years, were satisfactorily solved, and the
new government gained international recognition.
Obreg6n achieved a constitutional reform in order to enable him
to hold office for a second term. He won the election but did not
assume office. In the midst of a conflict with the Church, a fanatic
young Catholic militant prevented it. The magnitude of the
elected President aroused the agitation of the armed leaders
throughout the country. Again, rifles, not votes, determined the
nation's direction.
Incumbent President Calles summoned the strongest and most
prestigious warlords and achieved an agreement to give the presi-
dential succession the solution provided for in the Constitution
(appointment of a provisional President by the Congress and call
for an election). A National Revolutionary Party (PNR) was
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founded as a compromise among those who exercised real power to
institutionalize political life, giving each participation in the deci-
sion process and fulfilling his demands in a satisfactory manner.
It was initially a party of "groups" and "notables." There was no
power in Mexico other than armed force, and no political solution
different than the agreement among those who held it.
The Party dominated Mexico's political life until the 2000 elec-
tions. At first controlled by Calles, who maintained real power
until 1938, the Party then acknowledged the President of the Re-
public as its only leader. Its denominations, corresponding to the
different stages in its development and purpose, were successively
National Revolutionary Party, Party of the Mexican Revolution
(PRM), and Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
Since its inception, the principle of no reelection was constitu-
tionally reestablished. The election of Presidents was held at the
regular intervals, every six years, as provided by the Constitution.
The President centralized real power at the federal, state, and
local levels. Each office holder of the Executive exercised unques-
tionable authority during the six years of his constitutional ten-
ure.
The party of notables was transformed by President L~zaro
Cirdenasinto into a party of masses supported by labor, peasant,
and middle-class organizations, with each being created from the
centers of authority. It changed its denomination to the Party of
the Mexican Revolution. At the time, the spontaneous and inde-
pendent organization of workers and peasants was minimal, weak,
ideologically divided, and prone to use violence. The new, semiof-
ficial organizations allowed for the progressive exclusion of the
military chiefs as a political force; the former revolutionary mili-
tias gave way to the professional army. A generation of officers,
with a new mentality, was groomed in military schools. The army
transformed into a loyal and powerful arm of the political system.
In Mexico, militarism in the Latin American style was unknown
in the twentieth century. Also absent were altercations among
political parties and the democratic interregnums that took place
in the rest of Ibero-America.
The requirements of economic development, as the population
grew at a high rate, accelerated centralization.
The principle of no reelection was respected, and the President
in turn acquired the indisputable leadership of the party. From
1934 until 2000, every President fulfilled his six-year term.
The Party controlled elections at the national, state, and mu-
nicipal levels. The candidates for governors, federal representa-
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tives, and senators were selected by the President. Corrupt elec-
toral practices were frequent; however, many times were unneces-
sary, given that the Presidential-Party system acquired legitimacy
as the country reached peace, stability, economic progress, and
social benefits in health, education, and social security. Total dis-
cipline, as well as respect for final decisions, was generated inter-
nally; pluralism of opinion was permitted within the party and
negotiations were normal. Once a decision was made, it was to be
carried out.
From 1934 to 1940, the six years of President Ldzaro Cdrdenas's
reign of power, the social pressures of peasants and workers be-
came irresistible. The reforms that were contemplated in the
Constitution were carried out; there was a division of the large
estates and agrarian grants, organization and encouragement of
labor demands, improvement of workers and freedom to strike,
programs of laic education and finally oil nationalization. These
measures alarmed the bourgeoisie, who organized Catholic move-
ments and founded the National Action Party (PAN). PAN was a
true institutional opposition that decided to act within the legal
framework, and in doing so, legitimized the system against which
it never spared criticism.
Cdrdenas handed over power, in a pragmatic turnover, to a con-
servative, Manuel Avila Camacho, revolutionary chief, moderate
and Catholic.
Camacho proclaimed national unity, looked for the moderation
of social demands, withered away agrarian reform and labor
movements, and acted in a conciliatory manner. Taking advan-
tage of the opportunities presented by the World War, he started
an economic development policy based on import substitution,
which would later be theorized and promoted by the Economic
Commission for Latin America, an organ of the United Nations.
The denomination of the party was changed to Institutional Revo-
lutionary Party. It was concluded that the revolutionary objec-
tives of social justice were accomplished; "institutions" were now
the national task.
The rule that every President elects his successor was estab-
lished and respected. Once the newly elected President took of-
fice, the previous one retired from political life.
The best years of the system were from 1940 to 1970, three dec-
ades of continuous economic growth at almost 6% per year.
The strengthening of the central authority invalidated the fed-
eral structure and the independence of Congress and of the states.
The President used the structure of the party.
Fall 2009 773
Duquesne Law Review
The system was founded on a novel combination of authoritar-
ian imposition (moderate in the use of force) with a search for le-
gitimacy, found with respect to the individual, not political, rights,
as well as the opening of the party and from the whole political
system to diverse social groups. The recruitment of new elements
was promoted, and a political class groomed.
In the workers and peasants organizations, the leaders were co-
opted in or even promoted and imposed. Their performance was
rewarded with seats as representatives and senators, and a re-
warding political career could continue.
Labor negotiations always sought to increase real wages with-
out curbing firms' margins of revenue. Economic growth allowed
it.
The press and the media were controlled.
The party proclaimed itself "revolutionary" and developed an
ideology of social progress. But it was always pragmatic and con-
formed its principles to what the circumstances required. That
adaptation led to alternating conservative or revolutionary atti-
tudes.
The party always postulated social justice but was clearly anti-
communist. Moreover, even though in political discourse the ex-
cesses of capitalism were condemned, private enterprise was fa-
vored, although it was balanced with indispensable social meas-
ures and a strong range of public companies. Many of them were
seized by the state after private owners led them to bankruptcy.
The Party was the fundamental tool of the system for the articu-
lation of the enormous quantity of interests that arose in the Re-
public, dealing with formally organized and informal groups. The
negotiation processes were a permanent task. The management of
demands was sponsored by the hierarchal structure at the na-
tional level. The governors were the natural leaders of the party
in their respective states, even though the central authority of the
Party always sent a "delegate" to facilitate the communication
with the central organs of power and serve as a "counterweight."
Differences were always resolved "in the family."
Another mechanism the system used to articulate interests was
the public administration. If, at the beginning, it was merely a
bounty for the victors early on, some sectors developed technically,
including basically hydraulic engineering, communications, and
finance. The bureaucracy was transformed into one of the pillars
of the system, maintaining a discreet attitude at the beginning to
finally dominate the political apparatus. The "candidate" for the
next Presidency was always a secretary of state in the outgoing
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administration, starting with President Luis Echeverria, although
he had not previously held elective office but was groomed in a
career within the federal bureaucracy. 24 The next four presidents
of Mexico belonged to the financial sector of the government. The
traditional politician was eclipsed and gave way to the technocrat.
This "takeover" originated the separation in 1988 of an important
group of politicians within the PRI and their later foundation of
the third party in Mexico today, the Party of the Democratic Revo-
lution (PRD), which attracted the entire left.
Population growth coincided with the decline of the closed eco-
nomic system based on the program of import substitution, which
fostered an overprotected industry directed toward the internal
market, favored with low prices for energy and agricultural prod-
ucts in detriment of rural conditions.
Recurrent economic crisis was a result not only of internal mis-
management but also of global problems that caused damages felt
by a growing and ever more educated middle class, whose de-
mands were not satisfied. The manifestations of restlessness were
independent movements of railway workers, teachers, medical
doctors, and employees from official institutions and students.
They were repressed through the incarceration of their leaders.
The use of force was rather moderate.
The loss of legitimacy of the old system became obvious since
the tragic occurrences of 1968, when the brutality in the repres-
sion of protests traumatized the country. It was hastened during
the six-year terms of 1970-1976 and 1976-1982, due to the eco-
nomic crisis and its consequences, including the severe adjust-
ments that were required by necessity in the following six-year
term.
Movements by part of the provincial bourgeoisie arose, first at
the level of cities (San Luis Potosi, Chihuahua, Guanajuato) and
later of states, headed by local leaders that demanded greater par-
ticipation, free expression of the vote, and respect for the results of
the local elections. The National Action Party, traditionally pro-
business and Catholic, was strengthened by this new force.
However, the PRI was able to win three of the following elec-
tions, each time with a less margin advantage of the vote.25
24. President Luis Echeverria served as President from 1970 to 1976.




In Mexico, the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic
regime was achieved by a process of successive constitutional re-
forms that took place in the measure that political demands for
changes did not admit postponements.
In 1963, with electoral triumphs of PRI on all fronts, federal,
state, and municipal, an omnipotent national presence was re-
vealed that seemed increasingly unbelievable and disheartening
for the ranks of the opposition. In addition, "party representa-
tives" were created in accordance with voting percentages, foster-
ing the entry into the Lower Chamber of a limited number of op-
position members.2
6
In 1977, the system of proportional representation was intro-
duced as a complement to the majority one in composition of the
Chamber of Deputies.
Successive reforms in 1977, 1983, 1990, 1993, and 1996 defini-
tively opened up the system to the opposition; they established the
organization and surveillance of elections by an autonomous
agency complemented with an electoral justice system; set rules
for public financing of the political parties and regulating their
practices; elevated the Federal District to a status of semi-
autonomy with elected legislature and government; granted judi-
cial controls over the Executive and Legislative, and comple-
mented the control of constitutionality with a system of judicial
writs to resolve conflicts between federal, state, and municipal
powers and authorities.
In 1989, the first opposition governor was elected and took of-
fice.
The opposition parties acceded to the Congress, and the process
of organizing clear and clean elections advanced. Although Presi-
dentialism was severely criticized, unipersonal authority was not
immediately challenged because the holders of the Executive ac-
cepted dialogue concerning the reforms and carried them out.
Nothing of the design of the new relationship among powers was
discussed. "Reform of the State" was not addressed until much
later by the political parties.
The reforms in the final stage were promoted by strong individ-
ual personalities: Cuauht6moc Cirdenas Sol6rzano, and Porfirio
Mufioz Ledo (PRD) and Diego Fernandez de Ceballos (PAN).
26. The limited number of opposition members were mostly PAN militants.
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These reforms were accepted by Presidents Carlos Salinas de Gor-
tari and Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le6n. Both exercised "authori-
tarian presidentialism" to obtain the docile acceptance of the PRI
at federal and state levels, in such a way that the Constitution
could be reformed.
In 1997, the PRI lost the majority and the control of the Cham-
ber of Deputies. A member of the opposition was elected as Chief
of Government of the Federal District. The vote against the PRI
in the capital of the Republic was overwhelming. Politically and
doctrinally, inside and outside Mexico, the "democratic transition"
was announced, a label that by then had been coined by Political
Science and Constitutional Law.
The reforms benefited the political parties more than a civil so-
ciety prone to massive rallies in protest or support. They resulted
in deficient constructive organizational capacity and in which the
enormous socioeconomic inequalities and profound ideological di-
visions, whose roots steeped in the past seemed forgotten, became
obvious.
The political parties were thus the great generators and win-
ners of the political change. The Constitution gave them public
subsidies, the monopoly of candidacies for office, the exclusivity of
using media during their campaigns and the exclusive right to
seek an action of unconstitutionality against electoral laws. Fi-
nally, they are gaining influence on the autonomous agency in
charge with elections.
V. PRESIDENT-CONGRESS
The Constitution of 1917 attempted to create a balance between
the Congress and the Presidency through the classic "check and
balances." The recent reforms have resulted in an increase of the
Congress powers.
A. Balances
1. Intervention by the President in the Legislative Process
The President has the power to send bills to the Congress to be
enacted as laws or decrees; he shares that power with deputies
and senators and the state legislatures. 27
27. MEX. CONST. art. 71, § 1.
Fall 2009 777
Duquesne Law Review
He has power to reject in full or in part any bill, and return it to
the chambers with the respective corrections. This "veto" can be
overridden if the original text is confirmed by two-thirds of the
total number of votes of each chamber, in which case it will be re-
turned to the Executive to be published.
28
2. Extraordinary Powers to Legislate
This situation arises in three cases:
i. Suspension of Human Rights
In the face of invasions, serious disturbance of public peace, and
any other situation that puts society in grave danger or conflict,
the President has the power, with the consent of the secretaries of
state departments, the directors of administrative departments,
and the attorney general, and with the assent of Congress, to sus-
pend in the whole country or in a specific location those human
rights which respect can slow a rapid and easy response to the
situation.
Once human rights have been suspended, Congress may grant
the authorizations it considers necessary for the Executive to face
the situation.
In these cases, the Executive acquires legislative powers. This
provision (Article 29) only came into effect once-as a result of
Mexico's entry into the Second World War.
ii. Export and Import Tariffs
Congress can provide the Executive powers to raise, increase,
diminish, or suppress quotas or tariffs for export and import pre-
viously established by the same Congress and further to restrict
imports, exports, and the transit of commodities.
29
iii. Health Emergencies
The General Health Council that depends on the Presidency has
the power to emit obligatory provisions of a general character in
case of epidemics.
30
28. MEX. CONST. art. 72, §§ A-C.
29. MEX. CONST. art. 131.
30. MEX. CONST. art. 73, § XVI.
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3. Duty to Inform
The Constitution establishes, in some cases, the duty of the Ex-
ecutive to inform the Chambers.
i.) At the opening of the first period of sessions of the Con-
gress, the President is due to present a state of the union
report in writing.
31
ii.) The secretaries of state departments and heads of admin-
istrative departments, once the period of ordinary ses-
sions is open, are due to report to Congress the state of
the respective areas under their jurisdiction. 32
iii.) Either of the chambers can summon the secretaries of
state departments, the Attorney General of the Republic,
the heads of the administrative departments, as well as
the directors of the federal agencies or public-owned
firms, to provide information when a law or a business
concerning their respective areas is under discussion.
33
iv.) Either of the chambers, by request of a fourth part of
their members, in the case of deputies, and of a half, in
the case of senators, can create commissions to investi-
gate the performance of said state agencies or public-
owned firms. The results of the investigations will be
made available to the Executive. 34
v.) The Secretary of the State in charge of the Treasury De-
partment is due to appear annually before the Chamber
of Deputies to present the projected budget and the bill of
the Law of Revenue submitted by the President.
35
4. Financial Acts
The Constitution orders the necessary approval of the Chamber
of Deputies (Article 74, fraction V) for the annual budget and for
the annual accounts. That of the Congress is required for the
passing of the Law of Appropriations 36 for the terms and the man-
31. MEX. CONST. art. 69.
32. MEX. CONST. art. 93, as amended, D.O. (Jan. 1, 1974; Dec. 6, 1977).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. MEX. CONST. art. 74, § IV.
36. MEX. CONST. art. 73, § VII.
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agement of the debt contracted by the Executive, for its payment,37
and for supplemental budgets.
38
5. Congressional Control Over Other Executive Acts
Other powers of the Executive are also subject to control.
i.) The Executive is the conductor of international policy.
39
However, it cannot declare war without a previous law
from the Congress.40 On the other hand, the treaties
signed by the Executive are not valid without the ap-
proval of the Senate.4 Additionally, the Executive is re-
quired to send troops outside the country's borders, to au-
thorize the entry of foreign troops into the national terri-
tory, and for the stationing of ships from another power
for more than a month in Mexican waters.
42
The Senate has the power to analyze the Executive's for-
eign policy.
43
ii.) The Executive requires the approval of the Senate to
transfer the National Guard outside of its respective
states.
44
iii.) The Executive requires the approval of the Senate for cer-
tain appointments: Attorney General, diplomatic agents,
general consuls, high-ranking Treasury officials, coronels
and other high-ranking officers in the National Army,
Navy, and Air Force, and the members of the board of the
Central Bank.
45
In certain cases, the Executive makes the proposition and
the Senate appoints: Justices of the Supreme Court of
Justice, provisional governor in the event that the consti-
tutional powers have disappeared in a state, judges of the
37. MEX. CONST. art. 73, § VIII.
38. MEX. CONST. art. 126.
39. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § X.
40. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § VIII; MEX. CONST. art. 73, § XII.
41. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § X; MEX. CONST. art. 76, § 1, as amended, D.O. (Feb. 12,
2007).
42. MEX. CONST. art. 76, § III.
43. MEX. CONST. art. 76, § I.
44. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § IV.
45. Id.
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tribunals of agrarian justice, and the substitute in the
case of removal of the Chief of Government of the Federal
District.46
6. Political Powers of the Senate
As a federal chamber, the Senate has some powers that are
merely political and affirm its position in face of the President:
i.) Declare, when the powers of a state have disappeared,
that it is necessary to appoint a provisional governor.
47
ii.) Appoint the provisional governor in the previous case,
under the proposal of the President unless the state's con-
stitution provides a provision to solve such a situation.48
iii.) Resolve the political controversies that arise among the
powers of a state when one of them requires the Senate to
intervene with that purpose or when, as a result of such
controversies, the constitutional order has been inter-
rupted by an armed conflict.49
iv.) Remove from office the Chief of Government of the Fed-
eral District for a behavior that affects the relations with
the Powers of the Union or the public order in the Federal
District.
50
7. Impeachment Power of the Chambers
The chambers have the power to authorize criminal procedures
when a public servant is accused of grave conduct so sanctioned.
Also, the chambers may judge him politically in the cases that the
Constitution establishes, always for a grave violation of the Con-
stitution.
51
The President, during his term of office, can only be accused of
treason and grave crimes. 52
46. MEX. CONST. art. 76, §§ IV, V, VII, & IX; MEX. CONST. art. 89, § XVIII; MEX. CONST.
art. 27, § XIX, as amended, D.O. (Aug. 20, 1993; Dec. 31, 1994) (1993 amendment added the
members of the board of the Central Bank; 1994 amendment added the attorney general).
47. MEX. CONST. art. 76, § V.
48. Id.
49. MEX. CONST. art. 76, § VI.
50. MEX. CONST. art. 122, as amended, D.O. (Aug. 22, 1996).
51. MEX. CONST. art. 74, § V; MEX. CONST. art. 76, § VII.
52. MEX. CONST. art. 108.
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B. Presidential Powers Excluded by Recent Reforms
The recent constitutional reforms have deprived the Presidency
of some of the powers acquired during the dominance of the Presi-
dent-Party system.
1. Electoral Reforms
The participation of the Executive in the organization of elec-
tions has been excluded and an autonomous agency was created
for that purpose, the Federal Electoral Institute.
53
A system of electoral justice was established to resolve conflicts
that formerly were submitted to presidential arbitration.5 4
2. Restructuring the Legislature
The new structure of the Chamber of Deputies, through the in-
troduction of the proportional representation, the reduction,
through limits, in the number of representatives that can belong
to a single party, the new composition of the Senate with minori-
ties, and as a consequence the difficulty to attain majority and the
impossibility of passing a constitutional reform by the representa-
tives that belong to a single parliamentary group, have weakened
the Presidency.5
The structural reforms of Congress established two periods of
sessions (larger legislative presence) and the extension of the pow-
ers to summon administrative officers to reinforce the presence of
Congress, even if no political responsibility can be derived.
56
The strengthening of the Senate has been bolstered, adding its
approval to appointments made by the President and with the des-
ignation of others under proposal from the Executive.
3. Other Reforms
i.) The semi-autonomous status given to the Federal Dis-
trict and the direct popular election of the Chief of Gov-
53. MEX. CONST. art. 41, as amended, D.O. (Apr. 6, 1990; Sept. 3, 1993; Apr. 19, 1994;
Aug. 22, 1996; Nov. 13, 2007).
54. MEX. CONST. art. 99, as amended, D.O. (Dec. 31, 1994; Aug. 22, 1996; Sept. 9, 2007;
Nov. 13, 2007).
55. MEX. CONST. arts. 52-54, as amended, D.O. (Dec. 6, 1977; Dec. 15, 1986; Aug. 22,
1996); MEX. CONST. art. 93, as amended, D.O. (Jan. 31, 1974; Dec. 6, 1977; Dec. 31, 1994;
Aug. 15, 2008).
56. See supra note 55; see also MEX. CONST. art. 93, as amended, D.O. (Jan. 31, 1974;
Dec. 6, 1977; Dec. 31, 1994; Aug. 15, 2008).
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ernment and of the local assembly deprived the Presi-
dent of an appointment that previously was his pre-
rogative and creates a strong autonomous entity in the
view of federal powers.5
7
ii.) The President is no longer the supreme agrarian au-
thority in the country, as the agrarian reform was de-
clared finished. His direct traditional relationship with
the peasant sector is thus weakened.
58
iii.) The statute of autonomy recognized to the religious or-
ganizations and the elimination of the intervention that
the Constitution permitted to the Executive in this
critical sector solidifies the social and political position
of the religious system.
59
iv.) The creation of the National Commission for Human
Rights sets up effective limits on the abusive activities
of the administration.60
v.) The ratification by the Senate of the Attorney General
limits the power of "absolute confidence," traditionally
recognized by the President in the appointment of the
person who held that position.6
1
vi.) The establishment of the autonomy statute for the
Bank of Mexico deprives the Executive of the monetary
policy.6
2
vii.) Congress and states have the power to act during con-
stitutional controversies, eventually subjecting the de-
cisions of the Executive to the Judicial Power.
viii.) The constitutional powers allocated to public admini-
stration have been reduced in the measure that the gov-
ernment has diminished the number of state firms by
selling them to private owners as a matter of economic
policy.
57. MEX. CONST. art. 122, as amended, D.O. (Oct. 25, 1993; Dec. 31, 1994).
58. MEX. CONST. art. 27, as amended, D.O. (Jan. 6, 1992; Jan. 28, 1992).
59. MEX. CONST. art. 130, as amended, D.O. (Jan. 28, 1992).
60. MEX. CONST. art. 101, § B, as amended, D.O. (Aug. 10, 1987).
61. MEX. CONST. art. 101, § A, as amended, D.O. (Dec. 31, 1994).
62. MEX. CONST. art. 28, as amended, D.O. (Aug. 20, 1993).
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ix.) The powers in economic matters have been reduced in
the measure that the Federal Government allows for a
freer operation of the markets, as the international
economic environment requires and reduces the inter-
vention to which it has been provided under the Consti-
tution.
x.) Most importantly, the present regime, with the
strengthening of the opposition parties, has whittled
away the informal source of power that the Executive
had: the leadership of a dominant party through which
active political life was centralized in his indisputable
leadership.
The Presidency has lost his "metaconstitutional" powers.
63
C. Exclusive Powers of the President
The President has preserved powers in exclusivity:
i.) Legislative initiative and veto.
64
ii.) Publication and enforcement of laws. 65
iii.) Issue of bylaws.6
6
iv.) Free appointment of the secretaries of state depart-
ments,67 one of the Counselors of the Federal Judicial
Board, 68 and other officials whose appointments are not
predetermined in another way in the Constitution or in
the laws;69 as well as the public servant who is in
charge of command of the public force in the Federal
District,70 although the last requires de facto coordina-
tion with the Chief of Government.
63. Metaconstitutional powers are the political powers that the President exercised as
the leader of the dominant political party that allowed him to "appoint" governors, repre-
sentatives, and senators in a nominal federal system.
64. MEX. CONST. art. 71.
65. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § I.
66. Id.
67. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § II.
68. MEX. CONST. art. 100.
69. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § II.
70. MEX. CONST. art. 122, as amended, D.O. (Aug. 22, 1996).
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v.) Use of the armed forces for internal security and exter-
nal defense of the Federation.
71
vi.) Direction of foreign affairs.
72
vii.) Heading of the public administration.
73
viii.) Expulsion of undesirable foreigners.
74
In accordance with the laws of Congress, it may contract debts,
take charge of public education, and grant pardons for crimes in
the jurisdiction of the federal tribunals.
75
VI. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The new judicial institutions that complete the system of consti-
tutional control give the Supreme Court of Justice a relevant role
in the separation of powers. The traditional "juicio de amparo," a
positive protection of human rights, is now under the jurisdiction
of Circuit and District Courts.
76
A. Constitutional Controversies
1. Concept and Origin
Article 105 grants exclusive powers to the Supreme Court of
Justice to resolve constitutional controversies that arise between:
i.) The Federation and a state or the Federal District;
ii.) The Federation and a municipality;
iii.) The Federal Executive Branch and the Congress of the
Union; the former and either of the Chambers of the
latter, or in its case, the Permanent Commission;
iv.) A state and another state;
v.) A state and the Federal District;
71. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § VI.
72. MEX. CONST. art. 89, § X.
73. MEX. CONST. art. 90.
74. MEX. CONST. art. 33.
75. MEX. CONST. art. 73, § VII; MEX. CONST. art. 3; MEX. CONST. art. 89, § XIV.
76. MEX. CONST. art. 105, as amended, D.O. (Dec. 31, 1994).
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vi.) The Federal District and a municipality;
vii.) Two municipalities located at different states;
viii.) Two powers within a State in disagreement about the
constitutionality of their actions or general provisions;
ix.) A state and one of its municipalities, in disagreement
about the constitutionality of their actions or general
provisions;
x.) A state and a municipality located in a different state,
in disagreement about the constitutionality of their ac-
tions or general provisions;
xi.) Two organs of government in the Federal District, in
disagreement about the constitutionality of their acts or
general provisions.
77
Where political conflicts are concerned, the intervention of the
Supreme Court of Justice cannot take place, as it is alien to its
functions as a court of law. They are reserved to the Senate.78
Controversies issued from electoral matters are expressly ex-
cluded from the knowledge of the Supreme Court of Justice.
There has been a tradition in Mexico of avoiding electoral mat-
ters to be decided by the Judiciary, in order to keep it away from
political debate and involvement. The new Mexican electoral sys-
tem has changed this focus with the setting up of an electoral jus-
tice through an autonomous and specialized court that is an inte-
gral part of the Federal Judicial Power but that acts independ-
ently.
The definition of "electoral matters" is established in Article 99:
i.) The appeals issued in the federal elections of deputies
and senators.
ii.) The appeals issued in the election of the President.
The High Court undertakes the final counting of votes
for the election of the President once all challenges and
appeals have been resolved and proceeds to issue the
declaration of validity of the election and that of the
77. Id.
78. MEX. CONST. art. 76, §§ V & VI.
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President Elect with respect to the candidate that has
obtained the majority.
iii.) The appeals against actions and resolutions of the fed-
eral electoral officers which are different from those set
forth in the preceding paragraphs, which violate consti-
tutional or legal norms.
iv.) The appeals against definitive actions and resolutions
of the authorities of the states in charge with organiza-
tion and decision on the elections or to resolve the con-
troversies issued in state elections that have been a
definite factor in the development of the respective
process or in the final result of the elections
v.) The appeals against actions and resolutions that violate
the political rights of the citizens to vote, be elected and
to enjoy freely and peaceful affiliation to participate in
the political affairs of the country.
vi.) The labor conflicts or differences between the Electoral
Tribunal and its employees.
vii.) The labor conflicts or differences between the Federal
Electoral Institute and its employees.
viii.) The determination and imposition of sanctions for elec-
toral wrongdoings.
79
The Electoral Tribunal acts through a High Central Court and
regional courts.
The Electoral Magistrates that integrate the Superior and re-
gional courts are elected by the vote of two-thirds of the members
present in the Chamber of Senators (or by the Permanent Com-
mission during Congress recesses) from nominations proposed by
the Supreme Court of Justice.80
The principle of the Supreme Constitutional Tribunal of the Su-
preme Court of Justice is reaffirmed. Also, in electoral matters:
Whenever a court of the Electoral Tribunal sustains a thesis
with respect to the unconstitutionality of some act or resolu-
tion or with respect to the interpretation of a precept of the




Constitution and said thesis can be contradicted by one sus-
tained in Federal Courts or the Plenary Session of the Su-
preme Court of Justice, any of the Justices, the Courts or the
parts, can denounce said contradiction, in the terms set forth
in the law, so that the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court
of Justice of the Nation definitively resolves which thesis
should prevail. The resolutions that are dictated in this in-
stance will not affect previously resolved matters.81
2. Effect of the Resolutions
The resolutions of the Supreme Court in constitutional contro-
versies will, in principle, have effect only with respect to the par-
ties in the controversy.8 2
However, they can have general effect if two conditions are ac-
complished:
i.) If the controversies have origin in general provisions (ei-
ther laws or bylaws) of the states and municipalities that
are challenged by the Federation; of the municipalities
challenged by the states; between the Executive power,
Congress of the Union, one of its Chambers or the Per-
manent Commission; between the powers of the same
state with respect to the constitutionality of their actions
or general provisions or between the organs of govern-
ment of the Federal District with respect to the constitu-
tionality of their actions or general provisions, and
ii.) If the resolution of the Supreme Court of Justice that de-
clares them invalid is approved by a majority of at least
eight votes.83
In this way, the resolution of unconstitutionality does achieve
erga omnes effects and can declare the invalidity of the provision
of a general character subject matter of the controversy.
81. Id.
82. MEX. CONST. art. 99, as amended, D.O. (Dec. 31, 1994).
83. Id.
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B. Actions of Unconstitutionality
1. Concept and Origin
The Supreme Court of Justice has powers to resolve cases is-
sued from "actions of unconstitutionality."
8 4
These are writs in favor of minorities that form part of the fed-
eral or state legislative branches against possible violations of the
Supreme Law in norms of a general character approved by the
majority. The same right was granted to political parties with
respect to the electoral laws and to the Attorney General of the
Republic.
They are defined as those that "have as a goal to resolve a pos-
sible contradiction between a norm of general character" and the
Constitution.
85
Those entitled to exercise the action are:
i.) Thirty-three percent of the members of the Chamber of
Deputies of the Congress of the Union appealing laws
passed by the Congress of the Union;
ii.) Thirty-three percent of the members of the Senate appeal-
ing laws passed by the Congress or international treaties
celebrated by the Mexican State approved by the Senate;
iii.) The Attorney General of the Republic, against federal,
state and Federal District, as well as international trea-
ties celebrated by the Mexican State;
iv.) Thirty-three percent of the members of one of the state
legislatures, against laws passed by the same organ;
v.) Thirty-three percent of the members of the Assembly of
Representatives of the Federal District, against the laws
passed by the same Assembly, and
vi.) The political parties registered before the Federal Elec-
toral Institute, through their national chairmanship,
against federal or local electoral laws; and the political
parties with state registration, through their chairman-




ship, exclusively against electoral laws passed by the leg-
islature of the state.
8 6
The only path to present nonconformity with the electoral laws
of the Constitution is that addressed in this article. This right of
action has been denied to the citizens.
2. Effect of the Resolutions
The resolutions can achieve erga omnes effects in accordance
with the final paragraph of fraction II of Article 105.
The resolutions of the Supreme Court of Justice can only declare
the invalidity of the challenged norms if they were approved by a
majority of at least eight votes.
8 7
VII. AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES
The Constitution has created autonomous agencies that are
characterized by:
* A specific jurisdiction constitutionally determined and
specified by a relevant law.
* Internal autonomy in their administration and decisions,
with independence from the traditional branches; they
have legal personality, their own assets, and free ad-
ministration of their budget.
* Their decisions are, as a rule, compulsory, although not
in all cases, and subject to the system of protection of
human and political rights that the Constitution estab-
lishes.
* Their chief officers are subject to the regime of account-
ability and responsibilities for public servants as the
members of the traditional branches. They can be im-
peached.
* Their employees are subject to the labor regime of work-
ers in the service of the state, as the rest of the tradi-
tional branches.88
There are six existing agencies:
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. This regime is established in the articles that create each agency; those articles are
referenced infra.
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A. The Central Bank (Bank of Mexico)
Following a global trend, it was considered necessary to grant
independence to monetary policy from political decisions that were
in many cases irresponsible and a source of grave economic crisis.
As a result, the independence of the Central Bank has been
granted to maintain prices and stability in exchange rates.
The Central Bank is by constitutional provision autonomous in
its operation and management.8 9 Its main objective is the stability
of the purchasing power of the national currency. No authority
has power to order the bank to grant financing.90
Its functions range from coining and banknote issuing to regu-
lating exchange rates, as well as banking and financial interme-
diation and services. Additionally, the bank has the necessary
authority to undertake such regulation and provide for its obser-
vance.91
The conduct of the bank is directed by a board of officers whose
designation is made by the President of the Republic with the ap-
proval of the Chamber of Senators or of the Permanent Commis-
sion during its recesses. 92 The President appoints one member of
the board as Governor and the others as Deputy Governors. 93 The
Governor holds office for six years, and the Deputy Governors for
eight.94 They can only be removed for grave cause established in
the same law, by the decision of the Board of Governors, or by two
of its members. 95
The decisions of the bank are compulsory.
96
The independence of the institution is a fact, and the conflict of
views between price and exchange rate stability, which the insti-
tution takes care of, and the pressure for lax policies favoring eco-
nomic growth that the President and the Secretary of the Treas-
ury seek, occurs frequently.
The Bank, not the Executive, has control over monetary policy.
97













B. National Commission on Human Rights
An agency designated as the National Commission on Human
Rights has been established to protect the human rights recog-
nized by the Constitution from abusive behavior by administrative
authorities. 98
The reasons for the creation of the Commission originated from
a continuous and persistent criticism of the violation of human
rights on the part of agencies belonging to the federal and state
executives, which in the United States of America and the Euro-
pean Union were denounced as common and everyday actions by
the "Mexican government."99 Violation of human rights in the ad-
ministrative sphere is unfortunately frequent, especially by the
police and the attorneys general's offices, particularly against the
populations that have no economic means or judicial information.
In response to this pressure, supported enthusiastically by non-
governmental organizations, the Commission was created and
immediately so were its state sisters. 100 The ombudsman, an in-
stitution of Scandinavian origin, was adopted.101
The Commission has no jurisdiction in electoral, legislative, la-
bor, or judicial matters. 10 2
The National Commission on Human Rights has a Consulting
Council integrated by 10 councillors that are elected by the vote of
two-thirds of the members present in the Chamber of Senators, or
during its recesses, by the Permanent Commission with the same
qualified vote. 10
3
The President of the National Commission on Human Rights,
who will also hold that office with respect to the Consulting Coun-
cil, is elected in the same terms as in the preceding paragraph. 04
He holds office for five years and can be reelected only once. 1 5
The President of the National Commission on Human Rights
will present a report on activities annually before the Powers of
98. MEX. CONST. art. 102(B), as amended, D.O. (Jan. 28, 1992).
99. It is impossible to elaborate on these abuses within the confines of this Article. For
years, newspapers covered these matters, supporting their allegations with press releases
from various state departments and nongovernmental agencies. Yet, these reports were
rejected by the Mexican government, and the abuses were never proved. The matter is
highly controversial.
100. Taken as common knowledge by constitutional and criminal lawyers, this Scandi-
navian institution would be very difficult for a student to trace to its roots.






The Separation of Powers in Mexico
the Union. 0 6 For this report, he shall appear before the Cham-
bers of the Congress.
10 7
The decisions of the Commission are simply "recommendations"
and are not of obligatory observance.108 However, because of the
diffusion they are given, they are effective pressure on the au-
thorities.
C. Universities and Institutions of Higher Education
The precedent is the autonomy that the National University
achieved in 1929.109
The Constitution provides in Article 3 that the universities and
other institutions of higher learning to which the law grants
autonomy shall have the power and responsibility to: govern
themselves; to carry out their goals to educate, investigate, and
disseminate culture in accordance with the constitutional princi-
ples respecting the freedom of education and investigation, and
the free examination and discussion of ideas; to determine their
plans and programs; to decide on the terms of hiring, promotion,
and permanence of their academic personnel; and to administrate
their own assets. 110
Each law establishes in particular the corresponding rules of in-
ternal administration.
D. Federal Electoral Institute
In Mexico, electoral organization and qualification was trans-
ferred from the municipality responsible to a Federal Government
power. Unfortunately, it was transformed into a practice subject
to manipulation and without credibility.
Today, the organization of federal elections is carried out by an
autonomous public agency denominated as the Federal Electoral
Institute."'
The Federal Electoral Institute is independent in its function,
management, and decisions. 112 It harbors within its structure
management, executive, technical, and supervisory organs.
113
106. See supra note 98.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The autonomy of National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) was first
provided by law. It came into the Mexican Constitution via D.O. (June 9, 1980).
110. See supra note 109.
111. MEX. CONST. art. 41, as amended, D.O. (Apr. 6, 1990; Sept. 3, 1993; Apr. 19, 1994;
Aug. 22, 1996; Nov. 13, 2007).
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The General Council is the directive board and is integrated by
a counselor President and eight electoral councillors of the Legis-
lative Power, the representatives of the political parties, and an
Executive Secretary. 114 They attend the sessions with a voice, but
not a vote. The Executive and technical organs have the neces-
sary qualified personnel available to render a professional elec-
toral service. A Comptroller General has in his charge, with tech-
nical and managerial autonomy, the audit of all the revenues and
expenses of the institute.
115
The Counselor President has a term of six years and can be re-
elected only once. 16 The electoral councillors occupy their offices
for nine years. 117 They are appointed in a staged manner and can-
not be reelected." l8 Both are elected by the vote of two-thirds of
the members present in the Chamber of Deputies, after proposal
by the parliamentary groups and ample social consultation.
The Executive Secretary is appointed with the vote of two-thirds
of the General Council, after proposal by its President. 119
The councilors of the Legislative Power are nominated by the
parliamentary groups with party affiliation in one of the Cham-
bers. 120  There is only one councillor for each parliamentary
group. 1
21
The Federal Electoral Institute is in charge of the activities re-
lated to civic training and education, electoral geography, the
rights and prerogatives of political associations and political par-
ties, voter registration and voter lists, the printing of electoral ma-
terials, the organization of the election and the clarity of the vote
counting, declarations of validity and certification of the elections
for representatives and senators, and counting of votes in the elec-
tion for President of the Republic as well as the regulation of elec-







116. MEX. CONST. art. 41, as amended, D.O. (Apr. 6, 1990; Sept. 3, 1993; Apr. 19, 1994;





121. MEX. CONST. art. 41, as amended, D.O. (Apr. 6, 1990; Sept. 3, 1993; Apr. 19, 1994;
Aug. 22, 1996; Nov. 13, 2007).
122. Id.
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The audit of the finances of national political parties is in the
charge of a technical organ of the General Council of the Institute,
with granted autonomy, whose head is designated by the vote of
two-thirds of the Council itself after nomination by the President
Councillor. 1
23
The political parties operate with permanent public financing
for their ordinary activities, temporary financing for those years in
which campaigns are held, and special financing for civic educa-
tion, investigation, and dissemination.
124
The Federal Electoral Institute is the sole authority that au-
thorizes the time that is granted to political parties, in accordance
with the law that corresponds to the state in radio and televi-
sion. 1
25
The Federal Electoral Institute was conceived as an impartial
citizen organ; however, it has been questioned with respect to the
results of the last Presidential election, without any wrongdoing
being proved.
The prevailing structure is the result of a negotiation among the
three main political parties, so it can be considered as a consensus
structure subject to the constant pressure of the parties. Given
this circumstance, its autonomy will only be real if its decisions
are accepted by the three parties and there is no interference in its
actions with respect to electoral processes, in the recounts, and in
its final decisions.
E. National Institute of Information Access
The National Institute of Information Access is an agency in
charge of promoting and disseminating the right to access the in-
formation of governmental activities and to protect personal data
in the power of branches and agencies.
126
It is integrated by five commissioners appointed by the Federal
Executive. 127 The Chamber of Senators, or the Permanent Com-
mission, in its case, can object to these appointments. 128 The com-









of the Constitution or the law that affect the attributes of the In-
stitute or after being sentenced for a grave crime.129
The commissioners elect a president for a period of two years. 130
F. National Institute of Statistics and Geography
The Institute is, in accordance with the provisions of Section B
of Article 26 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican
States, the agency responsible for coordinating the National Sys-
tem of Statistical and Geographic Information. 131
The Board is the highest managerial organ of the Institute and
is integrated by five members appointed by the President of the
Republic with the approval of the Chamber of Senators, or during
its recesses, of the Permanent Commission. 32
From the members of the Board, the Federal Executive appoints
the president of the Institute. 33 The rest of the members of the
Board act as vice-presidents. 34
The president of the Institute holds office for six years, and the
vice presidents of the Government Board for eight.1 35
VIII. THE NEW SYSTEM AT WORK
The presidential system's doctrine understands the separation
of powers, since the Federalist Papers were written, as a rule of
balance and collaboration for governance.
If the structure of the federal powers in the Mexican Constitu-
tion is analyzed, the main feature is the weakness of the Execu-
tive, in view of the difficulty of obtaining a majority in Congress.
The new system should be labeled as "congressional."
According to the constitutional provisions, 40% of the Chamber
of Deputies is composed by proportional representation, opening
opportunities to opposing political parties that were unable to gain
majorities in single-member constituencies. 36 The critical rules,
however, are the maximum limit that the Constitution imposes of
129. Id.
130. Id.





136. The present system was designed by amendment to the Mexican Constitution [D.O.
(Dec. 15, 1986)] and achieved by later amendments [D.O. (Apr. 6, 1990; Sept. 3, 1993; Aug.
22, 1996)].
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300 deputies belonging to one party in a chamber of 500 and a
"forced" minority participation in the Senate. 137 In order to reform
the Constitution, two-thirds of the Congress plus the majority of
state legislatures are necessary. No party can fulfill these re-
quirements: urgent energy, tax, and labor reforms require a new
constitutional framework that has been impossible to achieve.
The resulting so-called "mild reforms" have been issued more from
electoral opportunism, demagogy, and temporal political equilib-
riums than from long-term views and solutions.
The electoral system in force was designed to reduce the politi-
cal power of the then-dominant party, but it is now an impediment
for the President to achieve a majority in Congress. Even if the
citizens' vote favors massively a political party, the Constitution
hinders the majority will.
The party in power requires the votes of at least another one in
the opposition. Not that a majority is always necessary for the
working of the presidential system: in the United States, it is not
uncommon to have the chambers with a vote decision different
from that of the President's party. The possibility is, however,
always open to attain the majority, whereas the Mexican Consti-
tution expressly denies it.
The solution could be the "coalitions" that are so frequent in
parliamentary systems. But here we face the present situation of
the political parties.
The agreements respond to circumstances and not to permanent
alliances that can provide stability and certainty.
This has its origin in the lack of a true program in any of the
three parties. The rapid fall of the socialist block and the eco-
nomic and social imbalances resulting from global capitalism in its
current phase, plus the ones Mexico has been carrying, have
sowed confusion in the path of left and right and hampered the
design of a national project. In this cryptic map, it is hard to find
the "center."
The ground is fertile for hollow formulation or demagogic pro-
posals.
In a system of three political parties in which it is difficult to at-
tain agreements, clear deficiencies in the constitutional order are
evident. The most notable is the absence of a system of presiden-
tial substitution, which does not subject it to a consensus (difficult
to reach) in Congress in the case of the total absence of the office
137. MEX. CONST. art. 135, which has not been amended since 1917.
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holder and the lack of a second round in the Presidential election
that could legitimize a President who only receives a third of the
votes, opening the way to controversies such as the one which re-
sulted from the last election, in which the winner obtained only an
advantage of 1%.
In great measure, the PAN-PRI agreement achieved after the
presidential elections of 2006 has allowed for some cohesion in
Congress. But it must be noted that it is circumstantial, casuistic,
and not a permanent alliance, based on programmatic foundations
and conditions.
The Federal Judiciary acts with independence, both as a federal
court and as a constitutional controller. The Supreme Court of
Justice has decided impartially constitutional controversies. The
decisions have affected the Executive in noteworthy cases in which
its actions, in the form of bylaws and even of approved laws, have
been declared unconstitutional (bylaw on the Law of the Electric
Industry and various articles of the Law of Radio and Television).
The disagreements between the Executive and the Legislative
have forced the Judiciary to resolve issues that harbor strong po-
litical content, an undesirable situation, as was recently singled
out by the President of the Supreme Court himself in a clear
warning. The long shadow of the old idea of excluding the Federal
Judicial Power from the contagion of daily politics reappears with
the risk of limiting and so damaging the control of constitutional-
ity. It is better to exclude the Judicial Power from certain con-
flicts. It is the duty of the other two powers to resolve between
themselves the conflicts that will inevitably emerge.
The states have gained power.
Each government participates with a local Congress in which it
may or may not have a majority. The governors, independently of
their party affiliation, have assembled an informal body to negoti-
ate as a block with the Federation. Given the Constitution's pro-
hibition on states to celebrate agreements among themselves, they
have opted for a National Conference of Governors (CONAGO),
formed by the 31 governors plus the Chief of Government of the
Federal District. It meets periodically and, in the 2000-2006
term, worked with the recognition of the President. CONAGO has
been efficient in presenting a unified position and in obtaining
greater federal resources.
Few state elections have been questioned. It is a fact that po-
litical-economic groups have been strengthened in most of the
states, with family, cronies, and interest links, friendships or enti-
ties that dominate local politics and which, in the majority of the
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cases, accept the alternation of power as a normal occurrence, sub-
ject to the fulfillment of certain unwritten "rules of the game,"
based on respect to consolidated interests. There are other states
in which a dominant political group maintains control, and a few
where political forces are unleashed.
The three main political parties-the National Action Party, the
Party of the Democratic Revolution, and the Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party-control 90% of electoral results but do not offer any
real options. Their political force is more or less equivalent.
It is difficult to get the political parties to agree on the wide-
range solutions the nation requires.
The behavior of some groups of representatives in Congress re-
veals an infamous level of culture: the physical impediment for
the celebration of sessions is now a common practice termed
"takeover of the floor" (toma de la tribuna), supported by organ-
ized street mobilizations to curb the legislative process or even to
impede the vote of the majority.
Citizens have rejected these practices, as evidenced in the media
and polls. The political parties project a deplorable public image,
and only 20% of the electorate favors their performance. This
negative appreciation is aggravated by the fact that the financing
of political parties requires a massive amount of taxpayers' money.
This behavior can be explained by the novelty of the institutions
and the ignorance of parliamentary practices.
Mexico has no democratic tradition. Prior to the election of
2000, democracy was only practiced:
* A few months after the adoption of the Constitution of
1824 when confusion predominated over the will to cre-
ate institutions.
* Nine years after the restoration of the Republic in 1867
by Presidents Ju~rez and Lerdo, after the Civil War of
Reform and the French Intervention. However, in the
face of the permanent threat opposed by local caudillos,
government was carried out under the regime of suspen-
sion of rights at it was ruled and limited in the Constitu-
tion.
" A year and four months after the fall of the dictatorship
of Porfirio Diaz and the triumph of the Revolution with
the democratic Presidency of Francisco I. Madero (Nov.
6, 1911-Feb. 19, 1913), which ended in a military coup
and his subsequent murder.
It is necessary to free the possible attainment of the majority
from obstacles. This would imply reducing the number of repre-
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sentatives by proportional representation by 100 and the elimina-
tion of "national" senators by proportional representation (an ab-
errant creation contrary to the Federal State). Also, it would re-
quire the elimination of the minimum number of deputies that a
party can accredit. But it is difficult to attain such a reform. The
real power in Congress lies in the political parties that will reject
new rules.
The "democratic transition" was achieved constitutionally by
successive reforms. The necessary consolidation of normativity
and behavior appears to confront clear antidemocratic movements.
Particularly negative is the attitude followed by an important
sector of the Party of the Democratic Revolution with respect to
the results of the 2006 election. The losing candidate, Andr6s
Manuel L6pez Obrador-supported by strong contingents and
mass movements in the capital city-alleged fraud that could not
be proved before the electoral tribunal and rejected in full, and
with clarity, not only the recognition of the government (excluding
its own legislators now in Congress elected in the same process),
but the institutions themselves, and led an exalted, visceral, and
messianic movement. He lacks concrete programs and measures
and has no other purpose than the destabilization of the govern-
ment. From its unarticulated proposals, a regime similar to that
of Hugo Chdvez in Venezuela can be glimpsed.
While a strong antidemocratic movement exists, democratic
consolidation is difficult, and there is the risk of an authoritarian
reaction. In fact, there is a Catholic extreme right-wing move-
ment within the PAN, critical even of the government issued from
its own party.
The door is open to reflection on maintaining democratic atti-
tudes that proclaim antidemocratic practices.
The permanence of the Presidential-Party regime was possible
due to the absorption of the informal social structures: it organ-
ized and controlled workers and peasants; absorbed professional
associations; established a modus operandi with business leaders
and the Catholic Church, always softened by the possibility of ap-
plying limiting constitutional provisions; and it maintained con-
trol over the written press and later the collaboration of electronic
media.
Today, these structures have been freed, and each one is looking
for new social positions and roles.
There is not yet a consolidated civil society in Mexico. We un-
derstand civil society as a set of individuals, groups, movements,
and organizations diversified in their respective purposes, encom-
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passing diverse activities, coherent in their fundamental positions
and final goals, capable of taking initiatives, with autonomy from
the State, but with respect toward the prevailing institutions.
There is, however, a clear social stratification. The revolution of
1910 allowed for a new balance among social classes and the emi-
gration toward new places. The mestizaje accelerated, and there
were substantial advances in education, health, and housing. But
the population grew at an accelerated pace. Mexico has today 110
million inhabitants: 40% live below the poverty line; the distribu-
tion of income places the country among the most unequal; the
20% of the population registered as having the highest income re-
ceives 55% of national income, while the least-favored 20% re-
ceives only 4.1%; the indigenous population, after a recent episodic
appearance, seems to be forgotten again. All these cleavages are
present in urban and rural areas. 138
There is no full appreciation of the State of Laws. The local ju-
dicial systems are deficient, and there is the general perception
that the law favors the dominant classes. Corruption is deeply
ingrained in all strata of society.
The adoption of an open economy has increased these differ-
ences. The population with low income can be fertile soil for popu-
lism and demagogy.
The social strata with low income are exceedingly resentful, es-
pecially in the cities. For these groups, institutions and changes
have a different meaning than for the middle classes and upper-
income strata. They express themselves through protests and the
interruption of the daily life of the citizenry. These protests are in
great measure organized and sponsored by the antidemocratic
movement at the heart of the PRD, and they have resulted in the
strongest and most effective manifestation of civil society and are
the most effective in gaining the attention of the authorities.
The process toward the creation of groups with different ends
with autonomy from the State and with sufficient initiative and
influence is very slow. Education, in general, is ranked among the
lowest levels in the industrial world and even in the emerging
countries.
Intellectuals, academics, and businessmen expressed their ideas
fundamentally through the written press. Their social influence
had been reduced until now, due to the low reading habits of
138. [Editor's Note: Dr. Gamas declined to provide a specific source for these statistics.]
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Mexicans. They demand a relevant role for the citizenry whom
they consider to be deprived of their participatory rights.
With limited but growing influence inside and outside of Mexico,
intellectual groups that are not associated with any political party
have taken up the flag in defense of the Constitution and the laws
since the first controversial elections at the state level. Their
critical attitude is maintained. They are intelligent proponents
and severe critics.
But the main responsibility lies now in the real powers: the po-
litical parties in Congress and in government.
In July 2009, the intermediate election for the renewal of the
Chamber of Deputies will be a test for both: the society and the
political parties; the personalities of the candidates, the political
offers and behaviors from the parties, the transparence and con-
duction of the electoral process, and the way that the public opin-
ion reveals its influence on the whole process will be determined.
If democracy is going to be consolidated, it is imperative to con-
trol, looking for consensus and permanent agreements, the actual
competing political, economic, and social forces, defining the "rules
of the game" and the recognition that democracy is "the only game
in town." The task looks difficult in the measure that diversity
and pluralism are spreading.
The big question remains the necessity to reduce the economic
inequality. Democracy is associated, if not identified, with capital-
ism. Market economy is then the only democratic way to alleviate
in the short term and to reduce in the medium term the deep and
persistent unbalances the country has been suffering since colo-
nial times, harming a large population who finds, more and more,
that situation to be unacceptable.
The conciliation of economic development, political stability, and
economic homogeneity is the measure of the success of a democ-
ratic system and a necessity for its consolidation.
Otherwise, a new political oligarchy or an authoritarian reac-
tion appears to be undesirable possibilities.
802 Vol. 47
